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COMMENTS

THE REASONABLE PET: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS IN
CALIFORNIA COMMON INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER NAHRSTEDT V.
LAKESIDE VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM ASS'N,
INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Thirty-two million Americans live in common interest developments (CIDs);1 this amounts to one out of eight U.S. residents. 2 Of those thirty-two million, nearly one-fifth are in
California,3 representing a full twenty percent of the state's
population.4 Further, given the popularity of such developments and their rapid rate of growth,5 it is projected that
CIDs will house between twenty-five and thirty percent of all
U.S. residents by the year 2000.6 Nearly half of this rapidly
7
growing segment of the housing market are condominiums.
Though popular in Europe for many years, the condominium was virtually unheard of in the United States until the
1960's.1 The subsequent boom in popularity has been attributed to a number of factors, including the increased cost of
single family housing, 9 the availability of amenities at a real. Tara Aronson, Join a Homeowners Association with Your Eyes Open,
S.F. CHRON., July 13, 1994, at 6/Z1. Common interest development is the broad
term that includes condominiums, community apartments, stock cooperatives,
and planned single-family developments. 4 WITKIN, REAL PROPERTY § 307 (9th
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995).
2. Aronson, supra note 1, at 6/Z1.
3. Barbara Steuart, Cat Fightover Condo Rights, RECORDER, June 8, 1994,
at 1 (indicating that 6 million Californians live in CIDs).
4. Id.
5. Id. Locally, in 1993, sales of units in CIDs comprised 30% of all new
home sales statewide, and that figure increased to 55% in San Francisco. Id.
6. Evan McKenzie, Welcome Home; Do as We Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18,
1994, at A23.
7. EvAN McKENzIE, PRIVATOPIA 11 (1994).
8. JESSE DUKEMENIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 923 (3d ed. 1993).

9. Id.
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sonable price,' 0 the substantial tax advantages of homeowner
12
status,1 and the availability of mortgage insurance.
Whatever the reasons for this dramatic increase in popularity, condominium growth has been explosive in the United
States and shows little sign of slowing.13 As a result, present
day developments are often so large that they resemble independent municipalities, providing14such services as street
repair, street lighting, and utilities.
One of the central reasons for the tremendous popularity
of CIDs is the unique framework of rights, restrictions, and
use rights they offer buyers. 1 These are comprised of various
covenants, easements, and servitudes included in the master
deed or declaration. 16 These covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs), though often desirable, can impose stiff
restrictions on homeowners.' 7 The CC&Rs can control the
height of hedges, the style of home exteriors, open garage
doors, the displaying of the American flag,' 8 types of vehicles
driven by residents, 19 spouses below a certain age, signs, or
even a goodnight kiss on the front steps. 20 However, it is the
10. Id. These amenities may include swimming pools, recreation rooms,
tennis courts, etc. Id.
11. Id. (noting the deductibility of mortgage interest and property taxes).
12. Id. The National Housing Act of 1961 made mortgage insurance available to condominium buyers. 15A AM. JuR. 2d Condominiums and Co-operative
Apartments § 7 (1976).
13. MCKENziE, supra note 7, at 11. Including single-family planned developments and cooperative housing, the number of homeowner associations has
grown from fewer than 500 in 1964, to 150,000 in 1992. Id. Condominiums
represent over 40% of those numbers. Id. It is projected that there will be some
225,000 homeowners associations by 2000. Id.
14. Duffey v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1992). An
examination of CIDs as quasi-governmental entities which lack the accountability of an actual government body has recently been published. See generally
McKENZIE, supra note 7.
15. 4B RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY T 631, at 54-7 to 548 (1995).
16. Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion,and 'Reasonableness"in Private
Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41,
47 (1990). This declaration must be prepared prior to the time of the first sale
of land and is created by the CID's developer. Id.
17. McKENZIE, supra note 7, at 15-18. The book details some of the more
capricious restrictions imposed by CIDs. Id.
18. Ron Galperin, Property Values: Neighborhood Rules Clashing with
Freedom of Choice, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, Business, at 10.
19. See Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp. v. Black, 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App.
1987) (holding that a homeowners association can appropriately regulate the
type of vehicle parked on the property).
20. McKenzie, supra note 6, at A23.
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ability to restrict pets that led to the recent California
Supreme Court1 case, Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo2
minium Ass'n.
Nahrstedt involved the violation of a restriction in the
declaration that limited pet ownership to "domestic fish and
birds." 22 Natore Nahrstedt owned three cats in violation of
this restriction.2 3 When the homeowners association fined
her, she challenged the restriction as unreasonable because
her cats were "noiseless" and "created no nuisance."24 The
California Supreme Court overturned the appellate court
holding, which had found that Nahrstedt had stated a cause
of action, because the restriction was potentially unreasonable. 25 The supreme court decision established a new and
higher standard for judicial review of challenges to CID restrictions by preventing the examination of any particular
facts and instead limiting judicial review to an examination
of the restriction on its face. 2 6 In its holding, the court relied
on the need for both preservation of the social fabric of the
CID and judicial efficiency.2 7
This comment examines the holdings and rationales of
Nahrstedt and its underlying policy considerations of judicial
and financial efficiency.2 8 Though the efficiency concerns of
the court are well founded, this comment attempts to show
how these concerns might be addressed without unnecessarily blocking CID owners from the reasonable enjoyment of
their units. 2 9 This comment will also explore how present
practices in CID restriction enforcement result in inefficiency
and contributed to the result in the Nahrstedt case.3
21. 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
22. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1278 n.3. Justice Lucas, in a comment typical of
the lively debate this case sparked at oral argument, dryly interpreted this restriction to mean "no sharks." Claire Cooper, Court: Condo Can Ban Pets;
State Justices Uphold Rules of Housing Association, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 3,
1994, at Al.
23. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1278.
24. Id.
25. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299, 307
(Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
26. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 (Cal.
1994).
27. Id. at 1292.
28. See supra part III.B.3.
29. See supra part IV.
30. See supra part III.B.
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This comment proposes that the decisions of a CID association should be subject to substantial evidence review
under a writ of administrative mandamus in accordance with
California Civil Procedure Code section 1094.5.31 Under such
a system, the CID association would have to show that there
is substantial evidence of a provable harm resulting from the
violation of the restriction. 2 This would protect the property
interests of the other unit owners while curtailing the sometimes tyrannical enforcement of CID associations.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. An Overview of Condominium Law in California
1. Legislative History
California first began to regulate condominiums in 1963
with the enactment of the Condominium Act. 33 This Act clarified and standardized several aspects of the law but left
many others in the hands of private agreements. 4 Notably,
the Act was voluntary, applying only if a specific condominium plan had been recorded. 5
This Act was substantially altered by the Davis-Stirling
Common Interest Development Act of 1985.36 The DavisStirling Act centralized the laws governing all CIDs, whether
condominiums, community apartments, stock cooperatives,
or planned developments. 7 It changed the law in several
respects.
For example, a separate interest in a condominium no
longer had to be enclosed by walls. 38 It established procedures for amending existing regulations of the homeowners
association.3 9 It also placed limits on the homeowners association assessment increases 40 and standardized procedures
for placing liens on the units of delinquent payers of homeowners association fees.4 1
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).

32. See supra part IV.B.
33. 4 WITKIN, supra note 1, § 314.
34. Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1350-1376 (West Supp. 1996).
Id. § 1351(c).
Id. § 1351(f)(1).
Id. § 1356.
Id. § 1366(b).
Id. § 1367.
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After the implementation of the Davis-Stirling Act, the
process for the creation of a CID was also substantially
changed.4 2 Whereas the previous law had allowed the creation of the CID to be voluntary, the Davis-Stirling Act applies
"whenever a separate interest coupled with an interest in the
common area... is or has been conveyed."43 The code further
provides that one must record the condominium map (if one
exists), the final or parcel map, and the declaration."
The declaration is essentially the "master plan" for the
CID. 45 Under the Davis-Stirling Act, the declaration must
contain a legal description of the CID, the type of CID to be
built, the name of the homeowners association that will govern the CID, and all restrictions on the use or enjoyment of
any portion of the CID that are intended to be enforced as
equitable servitudes. 46 This declaration forms the basis for
the governing documents under which the CID will operate.4 7
However, it is only incorporated equitable servitudes that are
within the scope of this comment.
2.

California Case Law Priorto Nahrstedt

The two cases that deal most directly with the enforcement and reasonableness of CID restrictions prior to Nahrstedt are Bernardo Villas Management Corp. v. Black48 and
Portola Hills Community Ass'n v. James.4 9
In Bernardo Villas, the plaintiff had purchased a new
pickup truck that he parked in the condominium carport, in
violation of a regulation which prohibited the parking of any
"truck, camper, trailer, [or] boat of any kind."50 The association sued to enjoin him from parking the pickup and to recover $2060 in fines which it had levied against him.5 1 The
42. Compare CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1352-1353 (West Supp. 1996) with 1963
Cal. Stat. ch. 860, § 3 (repealed 1985).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1352 (West Supp. 1996).
44. Id.
45. 4 WITEIN, supra note 1, § 316(3)(a)-(c).
46. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1353(a) (West Supp. 1996).
47. Id. § 1351(j).
48. 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside
Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
49. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1992), overruled by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside
Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
50. Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
51. Id.
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trial court found for the resident, and the association
52
appealed.

In affirming the trial court's ruling, the court of appeal
found that the restriction was unreasonable as applied to
"clean noncommercial pickup trucks."5 3

Finding that the

pickup truck was for personal transportation and did not interfere with the other unit owners' "use and enjoyment of
54
their property," the restriction was found unreasonable.
The court concluded by stating that "[o]ne person's Bronco II
is another's Rolls-Royce." 5
Bernardo Villas essentially stands for the proposition
that a restriction is unreasonable if the particular violation of
that restriction does not interfere with the other homeown56
ers' use and enjoyment of their property.
The other major case relevant to this discussion is
PortolaHills Community Ass'n v. James.57 In PortolaHills,
the defendant proposed a backyard landscaping plan that included a satellite dish.58 The association's CC&Rs prohibited
the installation of a satellite dish, and the association approved his plan, with the exception of the dish.59 Nevertheless, the defendant installed a dish, and the association sued
for a permanent injunction, attorneys fees, and damages.6 °
At trial, it was found that the dish was not visible to
other residents or to the public. 6 ' The appellate court, in affirming the trial court's judgment for the defendant, applied
de novo review regarding the question of the reasonableness
of the restriction.62 In finding the restriction unreasonable,
the court noted that "[w]hether an amendment is reasonable
depends on the circumstances of the particular case."63
Given that the defendant's dish was not visible to the public,
the court questioned whether the restriction "promote[d] any
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
Id.
Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
Id.

57. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1992).
58. PortolaHills Community Ass'n, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 581-82.
61. Id. at 583.
62. Id.
63. Portola Hills Community Aas'n, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582 (quoting Ritchey

v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Ct. App. 1978)).
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legitimate goal of the association."6 4 The court found that the
restriction promoted no legitimate goal, and it further questioned whether an invisible satellite dish even fell within the
restriction.6 5
In both of the above cases, the reasonableness of the re66
striction was judged on a particularized, case-by-case basis.
This is the framework of appellate case law that existed prior
to Nahrstedt.
B.

Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village
1. Facts of Nahrstedt

The conflict began when Natore Nahrstedt considered
purchasing a unit at Lakeside Village.6 7 Lakeside Village
was a large condominium complex in Culver City with over
530 units sharing lobbies, hallways, laundry, and trash facilities. 68 Nahrstedt owned three cats. 69 Despite the development's prohibition against cats, she said she saw cats in several of the condominium windows, and her broker assured
her that the restriction was rarely enforced. 7 °
However, shortly after she moved in, an association
board member spotted one of her three cats sunning in the
window. 7 1 The homeowners association sent a letter to Nahrstedt demanding that she give up the cats. 72 When Nahr64. Id. at 583.
65. Id. The court noted that "the association's only legitimate concern is
with 'exterior' structures which are defined in the CC&Rs as those 'which [are]
visible to others in the [piroject and/or the public.'" Id. (quoting Declaration,
art. IX, § 2). In other words, the court questions whether a satellite dish is
really an exterior structure if no one sees it. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
67. Bernice Hirabayashi, Cat Fight; State Supreme Court Will Decide
Whether No-Pet Rules Have Bite, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at J1.
68. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Cal.
1994).
69. Id. The court of appeals' reference to them as "Fluffin, Muffin, and Ruffin" was entirely fanciful. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 299, 308 (Ct. App. 1992). Her three cats were in fact named Boo-Boo,
Dockers, and Tulip. Maura Dolan, Court Upholds Right to Ban Pets in Condos,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994, at Al. Nahrstedt was willing to spend $50,000 in
legal fees and endure four years of litigation because she considered her cats,
"like my children." Id. To demonstrate her strong affection for them she made
them cakes on their birthdays and turkey on Thanksgiving and Christmas. Id.
70. Hirabayashi, supra note 67, at J1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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stedt refused,73 the homeowners association began assessing
fines of $25 a month, which grew over the next two years to
$500 a month. 74 Nahrstedt refused to pay, and filed suit in
1990, alleging that the restriction was unreasonable because
her cats were always kept indoors, were "noiseless," and created "no nuisance."75
2. JudicialHistory
Nahrstedt's original suit named the homeowners association, its officers, and two of its employees as defendants.7 6
She asked that the court void the assessments, enjoin future
assessments, award damages for violation of privacy when
the association "peered" into her window, and award damages for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.7 7 She further asked the court to declare the pet restriction unreasonable when applied to indoor cats such as hers.7
The association demurred, arguing that the restriction furthered the "health, happiness, and peace of mind" of its residents and was therefore reasonable as a matter of law. 79 The
trial court sustained the demurrer as to all causes of action
and dismissed.8 0 Nahrstedt appealed."'

A divided court of appeal 82 reversed and remanded on
Nahrstedt's causes of action for invasion of privacy 83 and negligent infliction of emotional distress,8 4 finding that each
should have survived a demurrer. It further found that the
association had no authority to levy fines against Nahrstedt
because its authority was limited to fines for behavior involving the common areas.85 More relevant to this inquiry, the
73. Steuart, supra note 3, at 1. Nahrstedt in fact did more than merely
refuse; more exactly, she reportedly responded by saying, "Don't you L_ with
my cats." Id.
74. Id.
75. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Cal.
1994).
76. Id. at 1279.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1279.
81. Id.
82. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299 (Ct.
App. 1992), vacated, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
83. Id. at 308.
84. Id. at 309.
85. Id. at 311.
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court found that Nahrstedt had stated a cause of action for
declaratory relief regarding the reasonableness of the pet
restriction. 6
After brief reviews of both Portola Hills and Bernardo
Villas, the court noted that "whether the pet restriction at
issue in the case before us is an enforceable equitable servitude ... is a mixed issue of law and fact which can only be
resolved in the context of the particular circumstances."8 7
Having established the context in which reasonableness is to
be decided, the court went on to find that the standard to be
applied in deciding reasonableness was contained in California Civil Code section 1354(a).88
In the court's view, this statute should be construed to
mean that restrictions are reasonable when "they prohibit
conduct which, while otherwise lawful, in fact interferes with,
or has a reasonable likelihood of interfering with, the rights
of other condominium owners to the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of their property." 9 Based on this standard, the court
remanded, finding that, because Nahrstedt's cats did not interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of other owners, the restriction was potentially unreasonable. 90
Dissenting, Justice Hinz argued that the restriction
should be enforced "unless there are constitutional principals
at stake, enforcement is arbitrary, or the association fails to
follow its own procedures." 91 In support of his position, Justice Hinz cited the need to limit freedoms in a high-density
92
living space and the health problems associated with cats.
He also noted that the plaintiff consented to the restriction by
signing her housing contract and should therefore abide by
it. 93 Finally, he chastised the majority for its fanciful crea86. Id. at 305.
87. Nahrstedt, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307.
88. Id. at 306. California Civil Code § 1354(a) states:
The covenants and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable
equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the development. Unless the declaration states otherwise, these servitudes may be enforced
by any owner of a separate interest or by the association, or by both.
CAL. CIV. CODE §

1354(a) (West Supp. 1996).

89. Nahrstedt, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307.
90. Id. at 308, 311.
91. Id. at 312 (Hinz, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 314-15 (Hinz, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 315 (Hinz, J., dissenting). Justice Hinz' sentiment echoes that of
law and economics proponent Professor Epstein, who has said in this area,
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tion of names for the three cats involved. 94 Nahrstedt appealed and the California Supreme Court granted hearing on
November 19, 1992. 9 1
3. Holdings of Nahrstedt
a. The Majority Ruling
The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 96
In its central holding, the majority found that the appellate
court had erred when it determined the reasonableness of the
restriction on a particularized, case-by-case basis.97 Based on
an examination of the legislative intent of California Civil
Code section 1354, the court instead concluded that the determination of reasonableness must be made by looking at the
property development as a whole. 98 Because the legislature
characterized condominium CC&Rs as equitable servitudes,
the court found that the CC&Rs must be viewed and enforced
in the context of equitable servitude law.99 Therefore, the
court found that viewing the restriction in this context limited its inquiry to the broad scheme of the CID, rather than a
particular owner's circumstances.' 00
Under the law of equitable servitudes, a restriction will
be upheld "unless it violates a fundamental public policy, it
bears no rational relationship to the protection, preservation,
operation or purpose of the affected land, or its harmful effects on land use are otherwise so disproportionate to its benefits to affected homeowners that it should not be enforced." 1 ' In establishing this standard, the court
disapproved both BernardoVillas and PortolaHills as having
10 2
inappropriately considered specific circumstances.
"with notice secured by recordation, freedom of contract should control." Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1358 (1982).
94. Nahrstedt, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315.
95. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 839 P.2d 1019 (Cal. 1992).
96. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1292 (Cal.
1994).

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id. at 1285-86.
Id. at 1290.
Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1289.
Id.
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In support of its position, the court cited two out-of-state
appellate decisions: Hidden HarbourEstates v. Basso10 3 and
Noble v. Murphy.' °4 In Hidden Harbour, the Florida court
found that CID restrictions, such as the one at issue in Nahrstedt, should be enforced unless they are arbitrary, violate
public policy, or infringe on some fundamental constitutional
right. 10 5 In Noble, the Massachusetts court determined that
such restrictions could only be overturned on constitutional
or public policy grounds.10 6 The Noble court also decided that
expense of
such a standard spares the courts "the burden10 and
7
litigation."
lengthy
highly particularized and
This second factor of efficiency stated in Noble seems to
0 8 Its decihave weighed heavily with the Nahrstedt court.'
sion noted that predictability and stability are increased
when a prospective buyer of a CID unit can rely on the
CC&Rs to remain unchanged. 0 9 It further found that present owners would be protected from sudden increases in association fees due to the expense of a defense to a court challenge of a recorded CC&R."1 0 Nahrstedt finally decided that
the social fabric of a CID would be harmed not only by nonenforcement of a covenant, but also through enforcement
delayed by litigation."'
Having established a new standard for judicial review of
the reasonableness of the CC&Rs in a condominium complex," 2 the court found that Nahrstedt's complaint stated no
facts to support a finding that the burden of the restriction
was unreasonable. 1 3 It determined that there was nothing
that could "support a finding that the burden of the restriction on the affected property is so disproportionate to its benefit that the restriction is unreasonable."" 4 This sentence
103. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
104. 612 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
105. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1283-84.
106. Id. at 1284.
107. Id. (quoting Noble, 612 N.E.2d at 271).
108. Id. at 1287-89. The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the advantages of this new and higher standard in promoting financial and judicial efficiency. Id.
109. Id. at 1288.
110. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1288.
111. Id. at 1289.
112. Id. at 1290.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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represents the entirety of the court's balancing under the new
standard. 115 The court noted that the complaint centered on
the particular circumstances of Nahrstedt, her cats, and the
lack of any burden on her neighbors, rather than on the effect
on the complex as a whole.'1 6 The court seemingly ignored
the fact that a complaint filed prior to their decision did not
need to include facts relevant to the entire complex. 1 7 Despite this, the court did not allow Nahrstedt to amend her
complaint.""
Based on the grounds of judicial and financial efficiency,
and a strong presumption of validity that the restriction was
not unreasonable, the majority found that Nahrstedt had not
stated a cause of action for declaratory relief.1 9
b.

The Dissent

Justice Arabian dissented. 20 He did not contend that
the majority's standard was fundamentally flawed, but asserted that they failed to properly balance the benefit and
burden of the pet restriction. 12 In his view, the restriction
22
was unreasonable.
In examining the reasonableness of the restriction, he
first looked to the burden imposed by a pet restriction. 23 He
noted examples of the deep and abiding tradition of humananimal companionship, citing numerous examples of prominent persons who have owned household pets. 24 Perhaps
more importantly, Justice Arabian noted the well documented benefits to one's emotional and physical well-being
that are derived from pet ownership, especially by the elderly, children, and those who live alone. 125 He found that a
categorical ban on pet ownership denies a CID owner of these
substantial benefits. In essence, he re-characterized the bur115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1290.
Id.
See supra part II.A.2.
Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1294 n.4 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1292 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1294-95 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1294-95 & n.10 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1294 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
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on the benefits to be derived from
den imposed by1 2elaborating
6
pet ownership.

In comparing the burden of being denied pet ownership
to the benefit of the restriction, Justice Arabian found that
this particular ban was unreasonable. 127 He noted that, to
the extent such animals are not seen, heard, or smelled, there
is no actual benefit conferred on the other unit owners by the
restriction. 128 He contended that the lack of any perceived
benefit makes the restriction unreasonable as a matter of
law.' 29 He also asserted that the restriction should be struck
down on the grounds that it was arbitrary.13 0 It was, he
thought, inherently unsound and arbitrary because, while it
banned cats, it allowed birds, which raise all of the same
noise and sanitation concerns as a cat.' 3 ' Pointing out that
the majority was supposedly concerned for the "health, sanitation and noise concerns" of the other unit owners, Justice
Arabian saw this inconsistency3 2 as underscoring the unreasonableness of the restriction.1

Justice Arabian raised several valid points as to the majority's truncated analysis and severe standard. The question
then arises: What motivated the court's decision, and why
was its benefit/burden analysis of the restriction so cursory?
III.

ANALYSIS

Indeed, the majority's opinion seems unnecessarily harsh
and a sacrifice of access to judicial review for the sake of judicial efficiency. The new standard approaches preclusion ofjudicial review. Despite the new and more deferential standard, Justice Arabian rightly noted, "deference is not
abdication."' 3
Coercive Elements in CIDs
One cannot criticize the Nahrstedt majority if it is assumed that the contractual relationship between the CID and

A.

126. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
128. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1295 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1295 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
133. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1296 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (quoting People v.
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984)).
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its residents is entirely consensual. 1 34 Generally, once there
is true consent, freedom of contract should control. 135 Yet
there is evidence to show that there are elements of coercion
in this particular type of contractual relationship.1 36
There are several factors which indicate coercion in the
purchase of a CID unit. First, the absence or presence of certain restrictions can lead to the pervasive belief by buyers
that there is no CID which offers their particular set of preferences. 13 7 Those buyers therefore do not operate in a mar-

ket that they perceive as allowing them complete free choice.
This problem is related to an effect referred to as
13 8
"bundling."

"Bundling" occurs where the development is presented as
a package, and the buyer does not have the ability to bargain
about individual terms within the package. 1 39 Therefore, it

can arguably be asserted that consent in the CID market is
imperfect because the buyers are not unfettered in their decision-making process.
The purity of the buyer's consent is also mitigated by the
discretionary power a CID has over the decision of whether to
enforce a particular restriction. 140 Buyers may well undervalue the impact of this discretionary power because of its
unpredictability. 4 1 Objection to this discretion after consent
is undermined by the unequal bargaining positions of the
buyer and the CID.142 CIDs are frequently run by large corporations which have the resources and skill to litigate,
whereas the buyer will generally be less sophisticated and
143
possess fewer resources.

The buyer's awareness of the various restrictions is also
less than perfect. 144 The operative documents controlling the
CID must be obtained from the association, a title company,
134. Natelson, supra note 16, at 44.
135. Id.

136. See generally id.
137. Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion,and the Law of Servitudes, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 883, 894 (1988).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. at 895.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Natelson, supra note 16, at 59.
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or a lawyer. 145 These documents are often not provided "as
promptly as would be ideal." 146 This presents a problem in
that the buyer may have already made the decision to
specific documentation listpurchase without having seen the
1 47
ing its controlling restrictions.
Price is the final factor vitiating the consent of the CID
buyer. 14 8 CIDs are often the most affordable housing available.1 4 9 More importantly, they are often the only housing
many individuals can afford. 150 Again, this factor runs
counter to the idea of true consent.
Most of the arguments above are derived from liberal
legal scholarship.' 5 ' Nonetheless, the problem of true consent in CID ownership is viewed as substantial even by law
and economics scholars.1 5 2 One law and economics commentator has noted that "empirical research and case fact patterns strongly suggest that [CID] decisionmaking can be coercive as well as consensual."' 5 3
Despite repeated attempts, the courts have had difficulty
in applying transplanted standards to CIDs.'15 This is because CIDs are sui generis. 1 55 Nothing else in the legal landscape resembles their structure or mimics their characteristics. 15 6 One cannot make the usual assumptions about the
CID buyer's consent. Though the relationship is largely consensual, the factors noted above make an absolute transplant
and application of contractual consent inappropriate in an
analysis of CID ownership. This vitiated consent must be
weighed when examining enforcement, because it is upon
this consent that the enforcement is based.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. McKenzie, supra note 6, at A23.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See generally Alexander, supra note 137; Gerald E. Frug, Cities and
Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982).
152. See generally Natelson, supra note 16.
153. Id. at 87.
154. Id. at 55.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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The Trend Toward a Judicial Barricade

The practical effect of Nahrstedt on the possibility of a
successful judicial challenge to a recorded restriction is clear:
any such challenge will fail unless it is arbitrary, violates
public policy, abrogates a fundamental constitutional right,
or "imposes burdens on the use of the affected property that
substantially outweigh the restriction's benefits."1 57 Though
the last factor listed above might seem to imply a judicial inquiry into the relative reasonableness of the restriction,
Nahrstedt explicitly stated that the new standard "grant[s]
no unbridled license to question the wisdom of the restriction."158 To fully appreciate how severe and obstructive the
new standard is, it is useful to re-visit Bernardo Villas and
PortolaHills and examine how those cases would have fared
9
15
under the new standard.

In order to apply the new standard, one must dispense
with all of the specific details of the cases and examine
whether restrictions against satellite dishes 160 and pickup
trucks 161 are unreasonable on their face. Under the new
standard, it would be of no consequence that the satellite dish
was not visible, nor would it be relevant that pickup trucks
are now considered a common and acceptable passenger vehicle. 162 The only allowable inquiry after Nahrstedt is whether
the burden is unreasonable using a broad, facial benefit/burden analysis.

163

As applied to Bernardo Villas, the restriction would be
upheld because even though that particular pickup truck was
inoffensive, another might be the sort of worn work truck
157. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1292 (Cal.
1994).
158. Id.
159. See supra part II.B.
160. Portola Hills Community Ass'n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App.
1992), overruled by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275
(1994).
161. Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp. v. Black, 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App.
1987), overruled by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275
(1994).
162. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 (Cal.

1994) (stating that "the focus is on the project as a whole, not on the individual
homeowner").
163. Id.
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which the restriction was designed to prohibit. 164 Similarly,
in Portola Hills, the fact that this particular satellite dish
was not visible would be barred from consideration. 16 5 The

restriction itself, the general prohibition against satellite
dishes,1 66 would be upheld as reasonable because it is not arbitrary, a violation of public policy or constitutional rights,
satellite access unreasonanor is the burden of being denied
6 7
ble given the aesthetic benefit.1

Nonetheless, these hypothetical results under the new
standard seem contrary to the fundamental idea of basic fairness. What factors are driving the Nahrstedt court to this result which, in application, seems so unreasonable?
The Nahrstedt court rested much of its reasoning on the
1 68
proper interpretation of the law of equitable servitudes.
However, a closer reading reveals substantial court concerns
with the problem of judicial, social, and financial burdens resulting from the detailed factual determinations necessary
under the previous, fact-specific standard.169 The central
out-of-state case that Nahrstedt cited (and the only one that
involved a pet restriction), Noble v. Murphy,17 0 placed emphasis on the fact that the higher standard spares the courts
"the burden and expense of highly particularized and lengthy
litigation."1 7 1 The Nahrstedt court itself emphasized that the

new rule will be "clear, simple, and not subject to exceptions
based on the peculiar circumstances or hardships of individ-

164. Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp., 235 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510. The truck in
this case was a clean, new, passenger-oriented truck. Id. Under the Nahrstedt
standard, none of those facts would be admissible. Nahrstedt,878 P.2d at 1290.
165. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1278.
166. Portola Hills Community Ass'n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 581 (Ct.
App. 1992), overruled by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d
1275 (1994).
167. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1290 (finding that, so long as the restriction is
"rationally related" to a legitimate concern of the CID, the restriction is
enforceable).
168. Id. at 1278.
169. Id. at 1289. The court discusses the strain on the social fabric of a CID
if it is forced to make these fact-intensive determinations. Id. The court also
notes that, under the new standard, there will be fewer lawsuits brought, and
those which are brought will be dispensed with quickly. Id. at 1288.
170. 612 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
171. Noble, 612 N.E.2d at 271.
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ual residents."' 7 2 This standard results in a sacrifice of fairness to "the tyranny of the 'commonality.' "173
Yet, given the large number and rapid growth of CIDs,
the court's efficiency concerns must be addressed.' 7 4 To accomplish this, it is necessary to examine the present norms in
the enforcement of the recorded restrictive covenants in
CIDs.
C.

The Causes of Preemptive Enforcement

In all of the cases above - Nahrstedt, Bernardo Villas,
and Portola Hills - the homeowners associations enforced
the restrictions before any harm had actually occurred or any
neighbor had actually complained. 1 75 This seems counterproductive and inefficient. The association has little to gain
from enforcement where there is no complaint, yet they must
expend time, energy, and money to enforce the restriction.
Certainly where the enforcement becomes litigious, the association must draw substantially from funds raised through
homeowners fees, and possibly increase those monthly fees,
to address a problem which no homeowner has complained
about. 1 76 There are three central reasons for this preemptive
enforcement.
The first is the advice given to association board members that they will be held liable for actions they take in their
board member capacity. 1 77 In most states, board members
are protected by the business judgment rule, which protects
them from liability so long as they act prudently and in good
172. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1288 (Cal.
1994) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 1297 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
174. See supra part I.
175. In Nahrstedt, the complaint arose from a member of the association seeing one of Nahrstedt's cats sunning itself in a window inside of Nahrstedt's
unit. Hirabayashi, supra note 67, at J1. In Bernardo Villas, the association
enforced the rule of its own accord. Bernardo Villas Mgmt. Corp. v. Black, 235
Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village
Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (1994). In PortolaHills, the litigation arose from
interactions between the unit owner and an association board. Portola Hills
Community Ass'n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581 (Ct. App. 1992), overruled by
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (1994).
176. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1288 (noting its concern with increases in association fees as a result of protracted litigation).
177. McKENZIE, supra note 7, at 130.
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faith. 178 One way to protect themselves under this rule is to
179
seek expert advice.
In the enforcement of restrictions, this expert advice will
generally come from lawyers and property managers.'8 0
However, the conventional wisdom in this area is that all restrictions must be enforced harshly to avoid allegations of arbitrary enforcement. 18 ' Perhaps this general attitude is best
exemplified by one past president of the Community Association Institute who said that "[r]ules must be enforced uniformly, promptly, and firmly by the board. Delays can result
in waivers and allow the violator a defense that he or she
may otherwise not have had. Other homeowners may violate
the rule and eventually you have a general disregard of the
rules."' 82 Also, board members are often advised that if they
liable for a
fail to enforce a rule, they may be held personally
1 3
breach of fiduciary duty to the CID's members.
There is also serious doubt about the impartiality of such
advice.18 1 Often, those giving the advice are lawyers who
have built a practice on the enforcement of restrictions and so
have a personal financial interest in seeing a legal conflict
that they often recommend
arise. 1 5 Thus, it is not surprising
86
enforcement.
legal
harsh,
The second factor that contributes to this harsh enforcement is less concrete. This factor is the character of those
who volunteer to serve on association boards.' 87 Though they
give up evenings and weekends to these responsibilities, they
are not paid for their services.' 8 Certainly this attracts
those who are keenly interested and active in their communities, but it also attracts those with an authoritarian bent who
enjoy the perceived power of being an association board mem178. Id. For a discussion of the business judgment rule in this context, see
generally Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Note, Community Association Use Restrictions:
Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653 (1988).
179. McKENzIE, supra note 7, at 130.

180. Id. at 131.
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting F. Scott Jackson, The Buck Stops with the Board, COMMON
GROUND, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 34).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 132.
186. Id. at 131.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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ber. 189 Those of an authoritarian character are only encouraged by the stern enforcement urged by lawyers in the
field.190

The final factor that results in enforcement without
harm, and one that only exacerbates the first, is that board
members have been sued under California law for negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty. 19 1
One of the leading cases in breach of fiduciary duty is
Posey v. Levitt.1 92 There, the homeowners association was
found to have breached its fiduciary duty and forced to pay
the
$30,000 in damages to the complaining resident because
93
association failed to enforce its own restrictions.1
Similarly, Raven's Cove Townhomes v. Knuppe Development' 94 held that an association's board members may be
sued individually for breach of fiduciary duty where the board
financially harmed the association through mismanagement
95
and therefore affected the value of the shareholders.1
A negligence action was similarly upheld in FrancisT. v.
Village Green Owners Ass'n.' 9 6 In Francis T., the plaintiff
brought suit where the association negligently failed to maintain sufficient exterior lighting during a "crimewave" in the
area. 19 7 When her unit was robbed, she installed exterior
lighting of her own. 198 The association demanded she remove
it; she complied and was raped and robbed in her home that
same night. 199 The California Court of Appeals upheld her
action for negligence against both the association as a whole
and its members as individuals.2 0 0
The caution caused by decisions like those above is easily
seen in Duffey v. Superior Court.2 ° ' In Duffey, the association
itself brought an action for declaratory judgment on whether
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See generally Posey v. Leavitt, 280 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1991); Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Ct. App. 1983); Beehan v.
Lido Isle Community Ass'n, 137 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Ct. App. 1977).
192. 280 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1991).
193. Posey, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
194. 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1981).
195. Raven's Cove Townhomes, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
196. 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Ct. App. 1986).
197. FrancisT., 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
198. Id. at 459.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App. 1992).
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a proposed homeowner addition was barred by its own
CC&Rs.2 0 2 Here, the association was essentially asking the
court to determine whether or not it should make a particular
decision. 20 3 This is exactly the sort of judicial micro-management that the Nahrstedt court sought to avoid.20 4 Duffey only
serves to highlight the gross inefficiency inherent in the present system of CID restriction enforcement.
D.

The Inherent Inefficiency of the Present System

The fundamental problem posed by preemptive enforcement of CID restrictions is that it incurs costs on the association to address a problem that has not yet had any ill effects
on other residents.20 5 In these situations, there has been no
actual effect on the property rights of other residents, but
merely a violation of the restriction in the abstract sense.20 6
The association's essential function is to protect the property interests of all of the respective homeowners. When no
one has incurred a harm through a violation of a restriction,
the association is expending resources prematurely.20 7 This
preemptive enforcement short circuits the social norms which
are normally used between neighbors. 20 8 A recent book by
noted property commentator Robert Ellickson examined the
relative efficiency of social and legal controls in tightly knit
groups.

2 09

Robert Ellickson's Order Without Law
Noting the growth of language, cities, and economic markets as examples, Ellickson asserts that order often occurs
spontaneously and outside of the shadow of the law.2 10 As
evidence that people often ignore the law in favor of social
norms, he notes that, despite a Supreme Court ruling allowing flag burning, those who afterward attempted that
1.

202. Duffey, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
203. Id.
204. See supra part II.B.
205. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1288 (Cal.
1994).
206. See supra note 175.
207. See supra note 175.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 210-28.
209. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHoUT LAw (1991). Ellickson conducted
an examination of cattlemen and ranchers in Shasta County to analyze how
these individuals handled disputes. Id. at 2-3.
210. Id. at 5.
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very act were forcefully reminded by bystanders that the social rules had not changed with the legal rules.211
One of the book's central themes is an alteration of the
Coase Theorem. 2 12 The Coase Theorem is one of the funda-

mental tenets of law and economics theory.213 This theorem
asserts that people will bargain to their mutual advantage
from whatever starting points the legal system has bestowed
upon them.2 14 In the book's study of farmers and ranchers,
Ellickson discovers that this bargaining is instead done
through social norms which "trump formal legal
entitlement."2 15
In this study of neighbor disputes in rural Shasta
County, norms of "neighborliness" played the most important
role in their resolution. 21 The residents of that area used a
number of tactics to resolve disputes, and few of those tactics
involved the legal system.21 7 In fact, it was found that use of
the legal system to file an attorney-assisted claim for compensation was a last resort.21 8 It was regarded as the most severe and extreme measure that one could take in resolving a
dispute. 2 9 Legal action was generally shunned as inappropriate and even deviant behavior. 22° This is in sharp contrast
to the situation in CIDs, where legal action is the first and
only action taken.221
There are two central reasons why the Shasta County
neighbors avoided legal action: money and long-term residency. 222 The Shasta residents believed, and rightly so, that
legal recourse was the most expensive dispute resolution op211. Id. at 6.
212. Id. at vii.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 52. Ellickson noted that "live-and-let-live" attitudes, mental accounting of inter-neighbor debts, and self-help (including gossip about the offender) are all used prior to any legal involvement. Id. at 52-57.
218. Id. at 60.
219. Id.
220. Id. Various residents were quoted saying that "[bleing good neighbors
means no lawsuits" and that it causes "bad feelings." Id.
221. See supra part III.C.
222. ELLICKSON, supra note 209, at 54.
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tion.223 A typical resident reaction to legal proceedings was
that "[t]he only one who makes money.., is the lawyer."224
This supports the central theme of Ellickson's book, that social norms are a more efficient means of dispute resolution
than the legal system.225
The second force motivating the Shasta county neighbors
is the long-term residency of the individuals.226 Because
their interactions are continuing, they tend to exercise a selfrestraint and cooperation not present in "single-shot"
interactions.22 7
2. Application of Ellickson's Proposals to CIDs
Based on observation of these social norms, Ellickson
proposes and predicts that these same norms would apply to
suburban or urban neighbors. 228 Though it is generally sup-

posed that urban or suburban dwellers have weaker social
ties than rural dwellers,229 their relationships nonetheless

contain many of the same qualities as rural dwellers. 2 30 They

must cooperate on any number of issues including fencing,
trees, drainage, noise, and street parking. 231 They also share
the same need to avoid legal fees and promote long-term
relationships.232
However, the CID precludes the operation of these more
efficient social norms through its legalistic structure.2 3
Although a CID contains the elements necessary to allow the
operation of social controls including close-knit communities,
long-term residency, and the universal desire to avoid legal
fees,23 4 all of these elements are rendered moot by the homeowners association and its functions.
223. Id. at 281. Where the unrealistic element of zero transaction cost is
removed from the Coase Theorem, the function of the theorem becomes more
problematic. Id.
224. Id. at 61.
225. Id. at 55.
226. Id.
227. Id. These continuing relationships are referred to as "iterated" in gametheory terms. Id.
228. Id. at 270.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 270-71.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 271.
233. See supra part IIA.1-2.
234. ELLICKSON, supra note 209, at 271.
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First, the costs inherent in legal dispute resolution are
mitigated by the fact that those costs are divided and shared
by all of the residents of the CID.2 3' Therefore, the association board has little incentive to resolve the dispute efficiently. The association's monthly fees can simply be increased to compensate for the extra expenditure and no one
resident will carry a substantial burden.2 3 6 Therefore, no one
resident has a disincentive against bringing suit.
Amplifying this effect is the fact that the individuals responsible for making decisions about enforcement are generally the association's lawyers.2 3 7 Since they are the very individuals who will benefit from the association's legal fees,
they, not surprisingly, often encourage, rather than discourage, the more inefficient legal resolution of the conflict.2 8
Second, the close-knit and long-term aspects of the community, which would normally allow the social norms to operate, are rendered moot by the very existence of the association board.23 9 The board functions in the role of a neighbor,
yet has none of the same concerns of preserving harmony
that an actual neighbor would have. 2 40 The CID dispenses
with the classic situation of a next-door neighbor who is interested in remaining on good terms with another, or in being
241
well thought of in the community.
As has been pointed out, "lawmakers interested in the
resolution of humdrum disputes that arise within a group are
unlikely to improve upon the group's customary rules."2 4 2
Yet this legal preclusion of social norms is exactly what a CID
is designed to do.2 43 It is also worthwhile to note that Nahr235. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1288 (Cal.
1994) (noting the collective nature of association fees).
236. Id.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 175-86.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 175-86.
239. ELLICKSON, supra note 209, at 57. None of the factors which form the
resolution of disputes between neighbors - gossip, self-help retaliation, or
mental accounting of inter-neighbor debts - are applicable to a corporate entity. Id. at 52-58.
240. Id.
241. Id. (noting that truthful negative gossip plays an important role in the
action of social norms).
242. Id. at 283.
243. MCKENZIE, supra note 7, at 12-21. Tellingly, the CID's governing body
is sometimes called a neighborhood association. Id. Instead of the operation of
social norms to control behavior, CIDs use black letter rules and restrictions,
rigidly enforcing the rules against violators. See supra part III.C.
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stedt, the plaintiff in the central case, paid greater heed to
perceived social norms than to contractual restrictions.244 In
making her decision to purchase, she relied more on the
salesperson's assurance that the pet restriction was largely
unenforced, and on the presence of cats in the windows, than
she did on the binding contract.245
It is problematic when the law impedes social controls.246
It has been asserted that "[1]aw varies inversely with other
social control."24 7 Given this, preemptive enforcement by as-

sociation boards not only prevents the operation of efficient
social controls in a particular case, but also inhibits them
from functioning in the future. 2 4' Ellickson points out that

laws of this kind will "lead to more nastiness within relationships." 24 9 He rightly notes that laws which do not foster in-

formal cooperation are likely to create situations where
"there is both more law and less order."25 °
Yet it is absurd to imagine that legal dispute resolution
may be dispensed with altogether. 25 1 As the magnitude of

the dispute rises, so too does the need for formal resolution.25 2 More importantly, social norms are only functional

when applied to common disputes.25 3 When fundamental entitlements or constitutional rights are involved, the legal system is the appropriate forum.25 4
Some system must be developed that can fulfill all of
these needs. The system should promote dispute resolution
through the most efficient means possible, whether those
means are social norms or litigation. It should unburden the
courts from the sort of absurd micro-management evidenced
in Duffey v. Superior Court.255 It should promote the health,
happiness, and safety of CID residents, while avoiding the
sometimes tyrannical preemptive enforcement of association
boards. These are the aims of the proposal presented.
244. Hirabayashi, supra note 67, at J1.
245. Id.
246. ELLICKSON, supra note 209, at 284.
247. Id. (quoting DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 107 (1976)).

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 286.

Id.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id.

254. Id.

255. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Ct. App. 1992).
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PROPOSAL

A. Review by Writ of Mandamus
To address the general judicial burden concerns of the
courts, CIDs should be included within the group of private
organizations that are subject to a writ of administrative
mandamus under California Civil Procedure Code section
1094.5.256 The writ of administrative mandamus applies
[w]here the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into
the validity of any final administrative order or decision
made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given ... and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corpo25 7
ration, board or officer.

In determining whether administrative mandamus is appropriate, "[t]he decisive question is whether the agency exercises an adjudicatory fimction." 25 1 The writ is more efficient
than a standard civil action in several respects.
The writ provides for trial by a court sitting without a
jury. 259 The hearing is limited to review of the administrative record which may be filed with the petition or may be
ordered to be filed by the court. 2 60 On review, the enforcement action of the CID would be subject to substantial evidence review. 261
Substantial evidence review is extremely cursory in that
abuse of discretion is only established if "the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole
record."2 62 This standard significantly limits the court's

256. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a) (West Supp. 1996).

257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 280 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal.
1955).

259. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a) (West Supp. 1996).
260. Id.
261. Id. § 1094.5(c). In fact, the court has the discretion to alter the level of
review to an independent judgment standard, but legislative provision could be
made to limit CID review to the lower substantial evidence standard. Id.
262. Id.
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26 4 it
scope of review. 263 Though a seemingly vague standard,
26 5
is an effective tool in limiting a court's discretion.
Thus, the writ limits the court's standard of review and
scope of inquiry, and eliminates the need for a jury trial. This
greatly enhances efficiency compared to a standard court proceeding such as is normally instituted in cases of CID restriction enforcement.
Though normally used to judicially review the decisions
of state and municipal administrative agencies, a writ of administrative mandamus has also been applied to corporations
and private hospital boards acting in a quasi-judicial manner.26 6 Hence, it is no great stretch of the statute's intent to
include CIDs within its purview.
The result would be that CIDs would conduct their own
hearings and generate a record for review by the court. This
267
alternative would be far less costly than a full court case.
Such a hearing would be made even more efficient, and lead
to a decrease in the number of actions being brought, by the
addition of one simple requirement that the association board
would have to prove in such a hearing: an actual harm
caused by the violation.

B.

The Requirement of a Provable Harm

In this context, a provable harm would take the form of
any real injury to another unit owner caused by the violation
of the CID restriction. For example, this could consist of a
neighbor's allergic reaction to a cat, or aesthetic offense being
taken due to the presence of a pickup truck or satellite dish.
In fact, any complaint which arose from the violation would
263. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD
REGULATORY POLICY 217 (3rd ed. 1992).

B.

STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND

264. Id. If it seems to the reader that the substantial evidence standard is
vague, it may be comforting to note that a prominent authority in the area of
administrative law, and now Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Breyer, has arrived at a similar conclusion. Id. at 216. "lit is not easy to determine in the
abstract precisely what the 'substantial evidence' standard requires of a court
....

"

Id. at 216-17.

265. Id. at 216.
266. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 567 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1977)
(holding that administrative mandamus is appropriate to review actions of nongovernmental agencies).
267. Hirabayashi, supra note 67, at J1. Though it is dificult to determine
CID legal fees, in the central case, Nahrstedt spent nearly $50,000. Dolan,
supra note 69, at Al.
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suffice. The injection of this simple standard would simultaneously cure many of the ills which currently plague CID restriction enforcement.2 68
It would dispense with the difficult and time-consuming
inquiry into whether a particular restriction is reasonable.2 6 9
A restriction, the violation of which results in a complaint or
injury is, by definition, a reasonable restriction because its
enforcement provides a benefit to the complaining party.27 °
If the complaint-causing restriction had not been violated,
there would have been no harm to the complaining party.
Thus, the court would not need to inquire into whether the
restriction is reasonable in the abstract, because the facts of a
particular case would provide de facto proof of its
reasonableness.
Elements of the social norms mentioned above would be
artificially injected into the proceeding by requiring that any
enforcement proceeding only be undertaken if there is a provable harm caused by the violation of the restriction. Social
norms, which tend to correct problems more efficiently, would
be allowed to function. Under the proposal, the fact that a
complaint was made to the association board would, in most
cases, demonstrate that those social norms had failed to rectify the problem. 2 71 This would then make it more appropriate to invoke a legal remedy because the best cost-avoider
has, in that instance, failed.27 2
Efficiency is further enhanced because proof of a single
harm would be all that is necessary to dispose of the issue.
Therefore, so long as the veracity of the complaint is established, there is no need for the sort of fact-intensive determinations that so concerned the Nahrstedt court. 2 73
Similarly, the fear of lawsuits against association board
members, the third problematic area in CID enforcement,
would also be assuaged. 4 Requiring that a provable harm
268. See supra part III.C-D.
269. See supra part II.B.
270. See supra part II.B.

271. See generally ELLIOKSON, supra note 209.
272. See id. Ellickson repeatedly noted that the subjects of his study only
invoked legal remedy where social norms had failed. See id.
273. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1289 (Cal.
1994). The court noted its concern over "a fact-intensive determination that can
only be made by examining in detail [the particular facts]." Id.
274. See supra part III.C.
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be a condition precedent to enforcement would prevent many
of the problems which motivate inefficient preemptive
enforcement.2 7 5
Such a requirement would release association board
members from the fear of allegations of arbitrary enforcement. 6 If a board member can only enforce those rules the
violation of which has resulted in a complaint or injury, the
scope of enforcement is narrowed. For example, a cat spotted
sitting in a window would not call for enforcement unless another resident complained that the very sight of it was offensive to him or her. Therefore, the board can focus on those
violations which in fact injure, harm, or offend another resident. Thus, it would be unnecessary to venture into the
realm of enforcement for its own sake, or enforcement which
is effected merely to prevent later problems with waiver or
arbitrary enforcement allegations.
Similarly, the conflict of interest problem for the associaOften, these lawyers are
tion lawyers would be minimized.
the very ones who profit from the legal enforcement. 8 Thus,
the impartiality of their advice is less than perfect. 9 With
the requirement of a provable harm, their advice would be
dictated not by self-interest, or by interpretation of an increasingly vague body of law, but rather by the presence or
absence of a single fact - a provable harm.
V.

CONCLUSION

This comment has attempted to show that CIDs are sui
generis. They are wholly distinct from any other entity in the
legal landscape. It follows that the legal system's attempt to
impose rule structures from other areas of the law has resulted in an unworkable system. One cannot pretend that
the unique structure of the CID does not demand new remedies. To act as the Nahrstedt court did, and attempt to remedy the problem through obstructive standards, is no solution. It is disingenuous to propose that the law of equitable
servitudes can be applied, without modification, to a new and
different set of circumstances.
275. See supra part III.B-C.
276. See supra part III.C.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.

279. See supra part III.B.
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CIDs are a relatively new phenomena in the United
States, and so it is natural that the courts have not yet fashioned an effective set of remedies for the special problems
they pose. This comment simply aims to propose one possible
solution.
Daniel R. Puterbaugh*

* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Professor Dorothy Glancy in the preparation of this comment.

